Substitution of Counsel - Notice of Substitution of Counsel March 13, 2023 (2024)

Case

Brooks, Victor v. W E Oneil Construction

Jul 30, 2024 |Arturo G. Hernandez |Personal Injury |2024CV031164

Case

Certain Underwriters At Lloyds v. The Board Of County Commissioners et al

Case

Longbridge Financial LLC v. Bush, Timothy J

Jul 31, 2024 |Arturo G. Hernandez |Rule 120 Deeds of Trust Public Trustee |2024CV031176

Case

Henry, Jenna et al v. Ehpp LLC

Jul 29, 2024 |Sarah Elizabeth Stout |Breach of Contract |2024CV031159

Case

Us Bank Trust Company National v. Farrell, Annette et al

Jul 29, 2024 |Arturo G. Hernandez |Rule 120 Deeds of Trust Public Trustee |2024CV031154

Case

Ferguson Enterprises LLC v. 911 Rooter And Plumbing LLC et al

Jul 26, 2024 |Arturo G. Hernandez |Goods Sold & Delivered |2024CV031148

Case

Rodriguez Ramirez, Elisa et al v. Mendoza Parra, Carlos

Jul 29, 2024 |Arturo G. Hernandez |Personal Injury Motor Vehicle |2024CV031162

Case

Trans Lease Inc v. Clark, Jeffrey Brad

Ruling

JOSUE MOLINA SANCHEZ, ET AL. VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Jul 30, 2024 |20STCV07830

Case Number: 20STCV07830 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: July 30, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 20STCV07830 MOTIONS: Petition for Minors Compromise MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Patricia Reyes-Uribe OPPOSING PARTY: Unopposed The Court has reviewed the Petition to Approve Compromise of Pending Action of a Minor, filed on by Petitioner Patricia Reyes-Uribe (Petitioner) on behalf of Claimant Eligh Molina, age 8. The Court denies the petition without prejudice for the following reasons. Petitioner states that Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident when he was two years old. The medical records in attachment 8 show that Claimant was taken to the emergency department on the date of the accident. The records show Claimant had a lip contusion and was instructed to follow-up with a primary care physician in 1-2 days. (Petition, pdf., p. 23.) There are no records of a follow-up examination. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts Claimant is recovered. However, given the type of incident, the Court requires a more recent medical record/report verifying Claimants current condition, or other evidence that claimant is fully recovered. Petitioner must provide attachment 11b(6), describing the reasons for varying settlements of Claimant and the other plaintiffs. Attachment 12b(4)(c) must include the most recent DHCS letter showing the $49.60 lien amount. Since it appears Petitioners attorney is representing other parties in this case besides Claimant, the response in item 17e must be changed and applicable attachment must be provided. In MC-351, Petitioner should include the information from attachment18b(5) in item 8b(2). Accordingly, the Court denies the petition without prejudice. Petitioner shall give notice and file a proof of service of such.

Ruling

FCS056706 - ESPINOSA, JOHN; ET AL v THE CITY OF VACAVILLE(DMS)

Jul 30, 2024 |FCS056706

FCS056706Motion for Summary JudgmentTENTATIVE RULINGDefendant City of Vacaville’s motion for summary judgment is granted.Defendant has established that it is entitled to design immunity. (Gov. Code § 830.6.)“[A] public entity claiming design immunity must establish three elements: (1) a causalrelationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval ofthe plan or design prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence supporting thereasonableness of the plan or design.” (Cornette v. Dep’t of Transp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th63, 69.) Because “the deferential ‘substantial evidence’ standard” applies to determinewhether a reasonable person would have approved the design, the normal rulesgoverning a motion for summary judgment are not fully applicable to cases involvingdesign immunity. (Wyckoff v. State of Cal. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 45, 50-51; Grenier v.City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 940.) The public entity is entitled toimmunity when there is substantial evidence of reasonableness, even if contradicted,and a civil engineer’s opinion regarding reasonableness is substantial evidence.(Grenier, 57 Cal.App.4th at 940-941.)Plaintiffs allege that the intersection “was dangerous and defectively panned, designed,drafted, engineered, constructed and positioned” and that Decedent’s fatal injuries“were a legal result of … the dangerous conditions”. (FAC, ¶¶ 18(a), 26.) It isundisputed that the plans for the intersection were designed by professional engineeringfirms and approved by a city engineer exercising his discretionary authority. (Plaintiffs’Separate Statement in Opposition, nos. 28-30, 34-36, 40-42.) It is undisputed that theplans “included, among other things, the design and layout of roads that make up thesubdivision, a street lighting plan, a planting plan, a stop sign to control traffic turningfrom Tipperary Drive onto BVR and a stop line marked on the pavement on TipperaryDrive at BVR”. (Id. at no. 37.) Defendant presents evidence that the plans employedengineering standards for sight lines and that the design of the intersection was andremains reasonable. (Decl. of Owens, ¶¶ 13, 23.)Consequently, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs to “establish all three elements of the lossof the design immunity”. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1268;Mirzada v. Dep’t of Transp. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 802, 506-807.) These elementsare: “(1) the plan or design has become dangerous because of a change in physicalconditions; (2) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerouscondition thus created; and (3) the public entity had a reasonable time to obtain thefunds and carry out the necessary remedial work to bring the property back intoconformity with a reasonable design or plan, or the public entity, unable to remedy thecondition due to practical impossibility or lack of funds, had not reasonably attempted toprovide adequate warnings.” (Cornette v. Dep’t of Transp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 66;Laabs, 163 Cal.App.4th at 1268; Mirzada, 111 Cal.App.4th at 806.) Design immunity isnot lost simply because of a change in physical conditions and “[t]here must beevidence that the design, under changed physical conditions, has produced adangerous condition of which the [public entity] is aware.” (Alvarez v. State of Cal.(1999) 79 Cal.App.4th 720, 737.)Plaintiffs have not met their burden. Although Plaintiffs present additional material factsestablishing a physical change in conditions in the form of trees and vegetation thatallegedly grew into sight obstructions for drivers (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement inOpposition, Additional Undisputed Facts 1-4), they have asserted no facts contended tobe undisputed, and have provided no evidence, establishing that Defendant had actualor constructive notice of the change in physical conditions, that Defendant had actual orconstructive notice that the change in physical condition was dangerous, or thatDefendant had reasonable time to obtain funds and carry out necessary remedial work.

Ruling

DARIOLE GORDY VS RENAISSANCE HOTEL HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.

Case Number: 21STCV36930 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 29 Motion to Continue Trial filed by Defendant Renaissance Hotel Management Company, LLC. Tentative The Court will call this matter and hear from counsel. The Court is concerned that defendants have not acted with appropriate diligence: they were aware of the conflict by February 2024, Defendant Renaissance did not retain new counsel until approximately late May 2024, and Defendant Sunstone apparently still has not retained new counsel. (Zech Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) Had defendants acted in a reasonably prompt manner, a much shorter continuance (if any) would have been required, and it is unclear to the Court why Plaintiff should have to wait for trial based on defendants lack of diligence. The Court would also like to understand why there has been such a delay in scheduling the PMQ depositions of defendants (and Sunstones own delay in retaining new counsel is not a particularly strong excuse). Background On October 6, 2021, Dariole Gordy (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Renaissance Hotel Holdings, Inc. (RHH), Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. (Marriott), Renaissance Los Angeles Airport Hotel, Doe Property Owner, Doe Property Manager, Does Installer, and Does 1 through 100 for premises liability and general negligence arising out of a trip and fall occurring on October 12, 2019. On January 10, 2022, RHH, Marriott, and Renaissance Hotel Operating Company, Inc. (erroneously sued as Renaissance Los Angeles Airport Hotel) (RHOC) filed an answer. On April 11, 2022, Plaintiff amended the complaint to name Renaissance Hotel Management Company, LLC (RHMC) as Doe 1 and Sunstone LA Airport, LLC (Sunstone) as Doe 2. On June 13 and 17, 2022, RHMC and Sunstone each filed an answer. On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff obtained an order correcting the true name of Sunstone to Sunstone LA Airport Lessee, Inc. On January 25, 2023, RHH, Marriott, RHOC, RHMC, and Sunstone (all represented by the same counsel) filed a cross-complaint against JC Developers, Inc., and Roes 1 through 25. On March 22, 2023, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed the claims in the complaint against RHH, Marriott, and RHOC without prejudice. On May 3, 2023, the cross-complainants amended their cross-complaint to name Ironwood General, Inc. (Ironwood) as Roe 1. On May 12, 2023, JC Developers, Inc. filed an answer and a cross-complaint against Ironwood and Moes 1 through 100. On June 2, 2023, the Court, at the request of Plaintiff, dismissed the claims in the complaint against Renaissance Los Angeles Airport Hotel without prejudice. In or about February 2024, counsel for RHMC and Sunstone discovered a conflict that made counsel unable to continue to represent either entity in this matter. (Zech Decl., ¶ 4.) It was not until about three months later, in late May, that RHMC approached new counsel, and in June 2024 new counsel substituted in for RHMC. (Id., ¶ 5.) Sunstone, however, has not substituted in new counsel, and counsel for Sunstone has not filed a motion to be relieved. Also in February 2024, Plaintiff noticed PMQ depositions for RHMC and Sunstone. (Miller Decl., ¶¶ 2, 6.) These PMQ depositions have not gone forward or even been scheduled. (Id., ¶¶ 4, 6.) On July 5, 2024, RHMC filed this motion to continue trial; trial is currently scheduled for October 1, 2024, and RHMC requests a new trial date on or after February 17, 2025. Plaintiff filed an opposition on July 17, and RHMC filed a reply on July 24. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), provides that the court has the power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. The power to determine when a continuance should be granted is within the discretion of the trial court. (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1603.) A trial court has wide latitude in the matter of calendar control including the granting or denying of continuances. (Park Motors, Inc. v. Cozens (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 12, 18.) To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. (Ibid.) Circ*mstances that may support a finding of good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circ*mstances that are relevant to the determination. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may consider: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circ*mstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) Discussion RHMC seeks a trial continuance based on the recent substitution of counsel required based upon the discovery of an ethical conflict. Based on the evidence in the record, it appears that the conflict was discovered in February 2024. (Zech Decl., ¶ 4.) Nonetheless, for reasons that are not explained, and with a trial date set for October 1, 2024, RHMC did not substitute in new counsel until late June 2024, and Sunstone still has not substituted in new counsel. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) The Court understands that a required substitution of counsel (as opposed to a voluntary substitution of counsel) is commonly good cause of a continuance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) But a party cannot force a continuance through its own lack of diligence in retaining new counsel. The Court will hear from the parties on the following issues. First, why did it take RHMC so long to retain new counsel? Second, now that new counsel has been in place for more than a month, why has RHMC not offered dates for its PMQ deposition? Third, why has Sunstone not yet substituted in new counsel and why, given the conflict and the delay by Sunstone, has Sunstones counsel not filed a motion to be relieved? Sunstone must understand that the case is going to move forward, and Sunstone will not be able to force a further continuance of trial based upon its own, unexplained, delay in retaining new counsel. Conclusion The Court will hear from counsel.

Ruling

JORGE ALBERTO SANTOS VS JOSE ARTHUR NESTOR, ET AL.

Case Number: 22STCV08385 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 29 Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Respond to Defendant Reina Nestors Form Interrogatories Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Respond to Defendant Jose Arthur Nestors Form Interrogatories Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Respond to Defendant Jose Arthur Nestors Special Interrogatories Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Respond to Defendant Jose Arthur Nestors Request for Production of Documents Tentative The motions to compel are granted. The requests for sanctions are denied. Background On March 8, 2022, Jorge Alberto Santos (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Jose Arthur Nestor (Jose) and Reina Nestor (Reina) (collectively Defendants), and Does 1 through 100 for negligence arising out of an automobile accident occurring on March 11 , 2020. Defendants filed an answer on October 11, 2023. On June 20, 2024, Defendants filed six motions to compel Plaintiffs responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Request for Production. Four of the motions are set for hearing on July 31 and the remaining two are set for hearing on August 1. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard A party must respond to interrogatories within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260, subd.(a).) If a party to whom interrogatories are directed does not provide a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (Id., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) There is no time limit for a motion to compel initial responses, and no meet and confer efforts are required. (See id., § 2030.290; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.) Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(1).) In addition, a party who fails to provide a timely response generally waives all objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) When a party moves to compel initial responses to interrogatories, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes [the motion], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) A party must respond to requests for production of documents within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.260, subd.(a).) If a party to whom requests for production of documents are directed does not provide timely responses, the requesting party may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (Id., § 2031.300, subd. (b).) There is no time limit for a motion to compel initial responses, and no meet and confer efforts are required. (See id., § 2031.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.) Nor must a separate statement be filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b)(1).) In addition, a party who fails to provide a timely response generally waives all objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a).) When a party moves to compel initial responses to requests for production, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes [the motion], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c).) In Chapter 7 of the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivision (d), defines [m]isuses of the discovery process to include [f]ailing to respond to or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. Where a party or attorney has engaged in misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose a monetary sanction in the amount of the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020, subd. (a).) Discussion On October 11, 2023, Defendant Jose served Plaintiff with Form Interrogatories (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Requests for Production (Set One), and Requests for Admission (Set One), and Defendant Reina served Plaintiff with Form Interrogatories (Set One). (Tsymbaloff Decls., ¶ 3 & Exhs. A.) Plaintiff has not responded to these discovery requests. (Id., ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants need not show anything more. The motions to compel Plaintiff to respond to the form interrogatories, the special interrogatories, and the requests for production are GRANTED. The requests for sanctions in connection with the motions to compel responses to the interrogatories and requests for production are DENIED. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivision (d), defines [m]isuses of the discovery process to include [f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery but does not independently authorize sanctions for such conduct. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides for the imposition of sanctions against any party or attorney who engages in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process [t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title [the Civil Discovery Act]. This section, itself, does not independently authorize sanctions. In the chapters of the Civil Discovery Act governing interrogatories and requests for production, the Legislature has authorized sanctions in the context of a motion to compel initial responses against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes the motion to compel. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (c) & 2031.300, subd. (c).) Here, however, Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. Accordingly, sanctions are not authorized under the Civil Discovery Act. Conclusion The Court GRANTS the Motions to Compel. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve code compliant, written, verified responses, without objection, to Defendant Jose Arthur Nestors Form Interrogatories (Set One) within 14 days of notice of this order. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve code compliant, written, verified responses, without objection, to Defendant Reina Nestors Form Interrogatories (Set One) within 14 days of notice of this order. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve code compliant, written, verified responses, without objection, to Defendant Jose Arthur Nestors Special Interrogatories (Set One) within 14 days of notice of this order. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve code compliant, written, verified responses, without objection, to Defendant Jose Arthur Nestors Requests for Production (Set One) within 14 days of notice of this order. The Court DENIES Defendants requests for monetary sanctions. Moving party is ORDERED to give notice.

Ruling

LUTHER vs SOTO HERRERA

Jul 30, 2024 |CVPS2303017

Motion for Reconsideration of RulingCVPS2303017 LUTHER vs SOTO HERRERA Granting Motion for Deemed Admissionsand Granting SanctionsTentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing will be conducted. Parties and counsel should beprepared to address whether this matter may be addressed in a motion other than one under Code ofCivil Procedure sections 2033.300.

Ruling

ANGELICA HERNANDEZ VS BRIAN WEAR, ET AL.

Case Number: 22STCV11389 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 29 Motion to Continue Trial filed by Defendants Brian Wear and Dora Albanez. Tentative The motion is granted in part. Background On April 4, 2022, Angelica Hernandez (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Brian Wear, Dora Albanez (collectively Defendants), and Does 1 through 20 for premises liability and general negligence arising out of a trip and fall on November 21, 2021. On May 30, 2023, Defendants filed an answer. On June 26, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The hearing on the motion is scheduled for January 17, 2025. On June 28, 2024, Defendants filed this motion to continue trial. No opposition has been filed. Trial is currently scheduled for October 7, 2024. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), provides that the court has the power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. The power to determine when a continuance should be granted is within the discretion of the trial court. (Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1603.) A trial court has wide latitude in the matter of calendar control including the granting or denying of continuances. (Park Motors, Inc. v. Cozens (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 12, 18.) To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for trial are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance. (Ibid.) Circ*mstances that may support a finding of good cause include: (1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circ*mstances; (4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) The addition of a new party if: (A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; or (B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case; (6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) In ruling on a motion or application for continuance, the court must consider all the facts and circ*mstances that are relevant to the determination. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may consider: (1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circ*mstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).) A trial court may not refuse to hear a summary judgment motion filed within the time limits of section 437c. (Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 526, 529; accord Cole v. Superior Court (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 84, 88.) Discussion Defendants request a trial continuance to accommodate their motion for summary judgment, set to be heard on January 17, 2025. Defendants motion for summary judgment was timely filed, and thus, Defendants have the right for the motion to be heard. The request to continue trial is GRANTED in part for good cause shown. Conclusion The Court GRANTS in part Defendants motion to continue trial. Trial is continued to mid March 2025. Good cause has not been shown for a longer continuance. The Final Status Conference and all deadlines are reset based on the new trial date. Moving Party is ORDERED to give notice.

Ruling

Cristofer Moreno vs Celestino Martinez Ramirez, et al

Jul 31, 2024 |23CV02553

23CV02553MORENO v. RAMIREZ MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL The unopposed motion to be relieved as counsel filed by Shaun J. Bauman is granted as itcomplies with California Rules of Court, Rule, 3.1362. The court will sign the proposed order.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Ruling

DOE vs PERRIS UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Aug 01, 2024 |CVRI2303798

Motion to Compel Further Responses toDOE vs PERRIS UNION HIGHCVRI2303798 Request for Production of Documents bySCHOOL DISTRICT,JANE BB DOETentative Ruling:As for RFPs, in a motion to compel further responses as to document requests, the moving partymust state specific facts demonstrating good cause justifying the discovery sought. (CCP§2031.310(b)(1).) To establish good cause, the moving party must demonstrate relevance andspecific facts justifying discovery. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (Guess? Inc.) (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th92, 98.) The burden to show good cause for production “is met simply by a fact-specific showingof relevance.” (Tbg Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) Then,the burden shifts for the opposing party to justify its objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4that 98.)Nos. 3-4 asks for documents reviewed or relied upon in responding to form interrogatories andspecial interrogatories. No. 5 asks for documents supporting affirmative defenses. No. 20 asksfor communications between District and any other party. No. 21 asks for documents relating tothe allegations of the complaint. District objected on attorney-client privilege, attorney-workproduct and FERPA, but ultimately responded. District failed to defend its privileges. As forFERPA, the information is directly relevant. The court should grant further responses withoutobjection, as it is unclear as to whether District withheld documents related to the objections. 1No. 9 asks for documents demonstrating discussions between District and Plaintiff’s mother. No.10 asks documents demonstrating complaints of Plaintiff’s bullying. No. 18 asks for social mediaand messages regarding the incidents in the complaint. No. 19 asks for communications thatrelate to Plaintiff. No. 22 asks for phots/videos relating to the incident. As with the interrogatories,District objected on FERPA, but ultimately responded. The court should grant further responseswithout objection, as it is unclear whether District withheld documents related to the objections.Nos. 14-17 asks for the disciplinary records of the assailants/harassers. District objected onFERPA. The information is relevant. The motion is granted.1Again, Plaintiff failed to challenge the substantive response.3.Motion to Compel Further Responses toDOE vs PERRIS UNION HIGHCVRI2303798 Special Interrogatories (Set One) bySCHOOL DISTRICT,JANE BB DOETentative Ruling:A party may file a motion compelling further answers to interrogatories and requests for productionif it finds that the response is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the responseis without merit or too general. (CCP §§2030.300, 2031.310.) Unless notice of the motion isgiven within 45 days of the service of the response, or any supplemental response, or on or beforeany specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed inwriting, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response. (CCP §§2030.300(c), 2031.310(c).) Defendant served original responses on 1/26/24 and supplementalresponses on 3/20/24. The motion is timely. (Hy Decl., Ex. B and F.)The parties are required to meet and confer. (CCP §§2030.300(b), 2031.310(b).) The partiesmet and conferred on the original responses, contrary to District’s assertion. (Hy Decl., Ex. C-E.)At the very minimum, Plaintiff raised FERPA as to all the requests at issues. However, there wasno meet and confer on the supplemental responses. A good faith meet and confer attemptrequires more than just an attempt to persuade the objector of the error of his or her ways, itrequires counsel to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. (Clementev. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) It requires a serious attempt by the moving partyto informally resolve each issue with the responses. (Id. at 1293.)A. Student Privacy20 U.S.C. § 1232g prohibits schools from obtaining public funding, if they fail to follow certainrules regarding education records (records directly related to a student and maintained by aneducational agency – 34 CFR § 99.3). However, the information may be provided in compliancewith judicial order, upon condition that the parents and the students are notified of the orders inadvance of the compliance. (Id. at §1232g(b)(2(B); see also 34 CFR § 99.31(a)(9)(i).) Inopposition, District admits that it has provided notice. Thus, this court can order disclosure uponnotice to the parents and students of this order.B. InterrogatoriesUpon a timely motion to compel further, the responding party has the burden to justify anyobjection or failure to fully respond to the interrogatory. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court(Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be ascomplete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the permits.” (CCP§2030.220(a).) “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to theextent possible.” (CCP §2030.220(b).) “If the responding party does not have personalknowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall makea reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information….” (CCP §2030.220(c).)No. 16 asks for all complaints made to District regarding Plaintiff being bullied, battered orthreatened. No. 17 asks for the identity of who made the complaint. No. 18 asks the responseto the complaint. No. 19 asks for documents evidencing the response. Defendant objected onFERPA and responded. Here, the information is directly relevant to Plaintiff’s case. As FERPAis no longer at issue, District should provide a further response without objection. To the actualresponse, Plaintiff provides no explanation for why the response are inadequate. The motion isgranted and District to provide a further response without objection as it is unclear whether Districtwithheld responses due to FERPA. 2No. 23 asks for witnesses of Plaintiff’s assault. No. 24 asks for the employees responsible forsupervising Plaintiff and the assailing students. No. 31-34 asks for the PMQ to testify about thedisciplinary records of Salas, Carassco, Mariah and Eddie. Again, District objected on FERPAand responded. Again, the information is directly relevant. But Plaintiff fails to provide anexplanation why the subsequent response is inadequate. The motion is granted and District toprovide a further response without objection as it is unclear whether District withheld responsesdue to FERPA.Summary of Ruling:Grant the motions. Defendant to provide further responses within 30 days without objections,after providing notice of this court order to the students and their parents. It is unclear whetherDefendant withheld documents/responses based on objections. The court makes no ruling as towhether the substantive responses are proper as Plaintiff did not challenge them.

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